In this paper, we analyze the dynamic relationship between CDS spreads and stock market implied credit spreads for a large set of European companies during the period [2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008]. We document that the stock market's informational dominance reported in previous studies holds only in times of financial crisis. During tranquil times, the CDS market's contribution to price discovery proves to be equal or higher than that of the stock market. In addition, we find that the credit risk level of the company has a positive effect on the information share of its stocks beyond the effect of the overall state of the economy. These conclusions are not in contradiction with the argument of insider trading in credit derivatives.
Introduction
Credit risk concerns almost all financial activities and, by definition, should be implicitly or explicitly reflected through market prices of credit sensitive claims, such as credit default swaps (CDS), bonds and stocks. These assets are traded in structurally different markets, implying probable differences in the relative speed with which respective markets respond to changes in underlying credit conditions. Accordingly, the key issue arises: Which of these markets more rapidly and more efficiently reflects new information regarding credit risk? In an attempt to solve this riddle, recent empirical work has focused primarily on finding the market that leads the credit risk price discovery process. This literature suggests that the stock market more often leads the CDS and bond markets than vice versa (Norden and Weber, 2009; Forte and Peña, 2009) and that the CDS market tends to lead the bond market (Longstaff et al., 2003; Blanco et al., 2005; Zhu, 2006; Norden and Weber, 2009; Forte and Peña, 2009 ).
This empirical evidence has typically been built upon cross-sectional analysis. Several studies suggest, however, that factors underlying credit risk discovery are, in fact, dynamic.
There is a well documented positive relationship between the credit quality of a particular company and the liquidity of its stocks (Odders-White and Ready, 2006) and bonds (Longstaff et al., 2005) . Furthermore, following the hypothesis of insider trading in credit derivatives, Acharya and Johnson (2007) demonstrate that in days with negative credit news and for companies that experience or are more likely to experience credit deterioration, information flows first into the CDS market and then into the more liquid stock market. In addition, Forte and Peña (2009) provide preliminary evidence that the informational content of CDS, bond and stock markets, does change over time. In light of these findings, two natural questions emerge. Are the relative market contributions to credit risk discovery time varying? If so, what factors influence the relative informational dominance of competing markets? Our precise aim in this paper is to provide further insight into these basic questions, with a particular focus on the stock and CDS markets and their relative informational dominance in crisis versus non-crisis periods.
In undertaking empirical analysis of credit risk discovery that involves stock and CDS markets, it is necessary to cope with the fact that CDS premia and stock prices represent remarkably different credit risk indicators. Market for credit derivatives, as the place where credit risk is explicitly traded, is expected to provide a "pure" measure of credit risk.
1 In contrast, information regarding credit risk is reflected only implicitly through stock prices. As a result of such differences, two approaches for analyzing the credit risk discovery process in respective markets have been proposed. The standard approach (Longstaff et al., 2003; Norden and Weber, 2009 ) consists of relating stock returns and changes in CDS premia by means of a VAR model. The more recent approach (Forte and Peña, 2009 ) is based on using information on stock prices, along with a small number of accounting items, to derive the socalled stock market implied credit spreads (ICS) by means of a structural credit risk model. A VECM representation can then be used to relate CDS spreads and ICS, as these two measures represent alternative proxies for the same latent variable: the pure credit spread. 2 In this paper we adopt the approach based on ICS. As already argued by Forte and Peña (2009) , changes in ICS reflect not only changes in stock prices, but also changes in other variables (e.g. the riskfree rate) all of which are found to be important in determining credit spreads. ICS also reflect the high non-linearity of the functional relationship between input variables and theoretical credit spreads and, as such, they convey some incremental information in comparison with traditionally used stock returns. Finally, the potential long-run equilibrium relationship between stock and CDS markets can be taken into account by means of the corresponding VECM representation, which is not theoretically grounded in the case of stock returns.
Our sample consists of CDS spreads and ICS for 92 non-financial European companies tracked during the period 2002-2008. 3 We find this time period to be particularly appropriate for the purposes of the present study. It includes the dot-com crisis (year 2002), the posterior period of quiet markets (2003 -mid-2007) , and also the sub-prime crisis (mid-2007 -2008) . On the basis of this sample, and assuming a time-varying framework, we analyze the credit risk discovery process in the stock and CDS market as well as factors underlying the relative informational dominance of respective markets. Our main results could be summarized as follows. First, we corroborate the conclusions in previous empirical tests based on data from the dot-com crisis (Norden and Weber, 2009; Forte and Peña; ), but at the same time we point out that these conclusions should not be extrapolated to other arbitrary time periods and, in particular, to non-crisis periods. More specifically, we find supporting evidence for the leading role of the stock market during the dot-com and subprime crises, but not during the in-between non-crisis period. Out of the financial crises, the CDS market's contribution to price discovery proves to be equal or higher than that of the stock market. Second, we document a positive effect of the credit risk level of the company on the information share of its stocks above and beyond the effect of the general state of the economy. Taken as a whole, our results indicate that the probability of the stock market's informational dominance is positively related to the level credit risk. This result, however, complements rather than contradicts the argument of insider trading in credit derivatives (Acharya and Johnson, 2007) . As the third main contribution of the paper we provide additional evidence of a positive relationship between the presence of severe credit deterioration shocks and the probability of the CDS market leading price discovery.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 describes the CDS and ICS database. Section 2 presents and applies the methodology for credit risk discovery analysis. Section 3 provides evidence of a time-varying relationship between CDS spreads and ICS, and studies the relative informational dominance of the stock and CDS market in crisis vs. non-crisis periods. Section 4 examines the specific factors underlying credit risk discovery in a time-varying context. Section 5 provides robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our main conclusions.
Data

CDS spreads
Data on CDS spreads is provided by GFI, an inter-dealer broker in credit derivatives.
4
The initial data set contains 1,641,326 intra-day quote and trade entries expressed in basis points for 643 European reference entities, including sovereigns, financial and non-financial companies, and publicly and not publicly traded companies. The data comprise information on the seniority of the reference issue, currency and maturity of the contract; however, there is no trade direction indicator, and no information on size. The data refer to actual executable and executed market prices where dealers commit capital and, as such, they reflect market sentiment rather than indications. As reported by GFI, these data have been previously corrected for errors using both experienced data analysts and statistical cleaning algorithms.
The time period spans from January 2002 to December 2008. 5 As indicated in Figure 1 , however, the number of available quote and trade entries is not evenly distributed across time but is increasing gradually till 2007. This reflects the steady development of the CDS market activity during the time period considered.
<Figure 1 about here>
In this study we consider only the most liquid euro-denominated 5-year maturity contracts (87.4% of the available entries), and contracts drawn on senior unsecured debt (87.8% of the available quote and trade entries). Given the purpose of our analysis, several additional criteria have been applied. First, sovereigns and companies that are not publicly traded (18.4% of the available quote and trade entries) are excluded from the sample; companies in the banking and finance sector (27.4% of the available quote and trade entries) are also excluded due to their different capital structure. Second, because market capitalization and other inputs required for the estimation of ICS are collected from
Datastream, several companies are further excluded due to the lack of an appropriate match or the required financial data. Third, with the aim of ensuring the availability of CDS spread observations on a daily basis we focus on reference entities with relatively active CDS contracts. For that purpose, all the companies with 0 trades in any of the considered years, and companies with quotes and trades available for less than 5% of the trading days in any of the considered years are also excluded from the sample.
Previous filtering leads to a final representative dataset of 622,488 intra-day bid and ask quotes and trade entries for 92 non-financial European companies with sufficiently regular quote updating frequency. The reduction in the initial dataset may appear significant; however, it is important to note that for the omitted sample the data are rather sparse. By way of example, within the initial dataset there are as much as 104 entities with no trades and 151 entities with less than 20 quotes during the overall sample period. The final sample actually comprises around 65% of the quote and trade entries of all non-financial publicly traded companies pertaining to the European region. Moreover, the final set of quotes and trades follows the distribution pattern of the initially available quotes and trades over different years (see Figure 2) . Another important characteristic of the final set of companies is that the homogeneity of the sample is ensured for the entire 2002-2008 period, so that the possibility of obtaining spurious results due to changes in the sample composition over time is avoided.
<Figure 2 about here>
Given that the final dataset contains only intra-day bid and ask quotes, daily CDS spread observations are constructed on the end-of-day basis in the following manner: if on a given day both bid and ask quotes are present, the CDS spread refers to the midpoint of the last bid and last ask quote; if on a given day only bid (ask) quotes are present, the CDS spread refers to the midpoint of the last bid (ask) quote on a given day and the most recently would imply a substantial reduction in the number of companies considered, and a substantial reduction of the availability of CDS spread observations on a daily basis. This is because actual transactions in the CDS market are still relatively scarce. By way of example, for the final sample the average quoting frequency per day is 320, whereas the trading frequency is only 24 (i.e. every 13 quotes result in one trade). Moreover, posted quotes are binding and cannot be withdrawn once they are hit. As such, composed CDS spreads represent a good approximation for the actual CDS prices.
Stock market implied credit spreads
Following Forte and Peña (2009), we derive stock market implied credit spreads on the basis of the structural model and calibration methodology suggested by Forte (2011) . In a nutshell, the firm asset value and volatility are consistently derived from equity prices, whereas the default barrier is calibrated from CDS premia. Additional inputs to the model are short-and long-term liabilities, interest expenses, cash dividends and 1-10 year swap rates.
Daily data on market capitalization (close of business) and on local swap rates are gathered from Datastream. Required balance-sheet items are represented by the mean of their annual values, collected also from Datastream. The recovery rate is set to 40% in line with the studies of Covitz and Han (2004) , Altman et al. (2005) and the industry practice. A more detailed description of the procedure is provided in Appendix A. 
Descriptive statistics
Credit Risk Discovery
Provided that stock and CDS markets price credit risk equally in the long-run, and as long as factors that differ from credit risk (e.g. liquidity considerations, measurement errors)
do not affect ICS and CDS time series on a permanent basis, the two credit spread series should be cointegrated. At the same time, the common factor could be thought of as the implicit, unobservable efficient price of credit risk.
We start by performing Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Tests for the presence of unit roots, where the corresponding number of lags is selected according to the Akaike Information Criterion. Results in Table 4 show that the null hypothesis -the level of the time series is non-stationary -is rejected at the 95% level for 7 companies (7.6% of the sample) in the case of CDS series and for 9 companies (9.8% of the sample) in the case of ICS series.
On the contrary, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for the first-differences of CDS spread and ICS series is rejected for all companies in the sample. Thus, it seems that CDS spreads and ICS are I(1) processes in levels and I(0) processes in differences and we can proceed with examining the eventual presence of a cointegrating relationship between the two time series. For that purpose we apply the VAR-based Johansen Cointegration Test. 6 As indicated in Table 5 , evidence of a cointegrating relationship is found for 51 companies (55.4% of the sample) at the 5% significance level, and for 56 (60.9% of the sample) at the 10% significance level. For these entities we conclude that there is statistical evidence that ICS and CDS spreads are driven, in the long-run, by the same common factor.
<Table 4 about here> <Table 5 about here>
Failure to detect cointegration using statistical tests does not necessarily imply the non-existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship. Cointegration tests have lower power when applied to data sets that contain observations covering a short time period. It is worth noting that, with a sample period of less than two years, and at the 5% significance level, Forte and Peña (2009) In the presence of cointegration, the short-term dynamics between CDS spreads and ICS is characterized by a VECM representation. Accordingly, the following two-dimensional VECM is specified for the sample of companies considered:
where, ε 1 and ε 2 are i.i.d. error terms, and the lag length p is determined according to the Schwarz Information Criterion. Loadings λ 1 and λ 2 represent the adjustment coefficients that measure the speed with which ICS and CDS spreads adjust to eliminate 'pricing errors' -deviations from the long-run equilibrium relationship. According to summary results in Table   6 (Panel A), it seems that there is an overall CDS market leadership during the period 2002-2008. To be specific, a strong one-way price adjustment of the stock market to the CDS market (i.e. λ 1 is significantly negative, λ 2 is not significant) is evident in 34 cases (37% of the sample); the reverse, strong one-way price adjustment of the CDS market to the stock market (i.e. λ 2 is significantly positive, λ 1 is not significant) holds for 18 cases (20% of the sample).
More formal measures of a single market contribution to price discovery are provided by Gonzalo and Granger (1995), and Hasbrouck (1995) . Gonzalo and Granger's (GG) measure is based on the ratio between the two factor loadings, defined as
In our case, the higher the GG measure, the higher the stock market contribution (the lower the CDS market contribution) to price discovery. Alternatively, Hasbrouck (1995) proposed the model of information shares, which assumes that the market that contributes more to the variance of innovations in the implicit unobservable efficient price (i.e. the common factor implied by cointegration) is informationally dominant and contributes more to price discovery. The information share of a given market is therefore determined by the proportion of the innovation variance that can be attributed to that market. When innovations are correlated, Hasbrouck suggests lower (HL) and upper (HU) limits for market shares: Results on GG and HM measures are provided in Table 6 (Panels B and C, respectively). In line with previous results, the GG statistic suggests a slight informational dominance of the CDS market. Specifically, the average GG measure for all the companies considered is 0.43, whereas a higher information share of the CDS (stock) market is evident in 53 (39) out of the 92 companies. 7 The average HM measure for all entities examined amounts to 0.44, supporting the general conclusion of a slight dominance of the CDS market in price discovery during the entire 2002-2008 sample period. According to this measure, the CDS (ICS) market dominates in 51 (41) out of the 92 cases investigated.
<Table 6 about here>
Our results seem to contradict the stock market dominance documented in previous literature; however, a more detailed -time-varying -analysis reveals that this is only partially true. We start by estimating yearly factor loadings for each company and period by imposing the entire sample cointegrating vector to the restricted time intervals, as in Forte and Peña (2009) . At the beginning of the sample period -year 2002 -the information share of the stock market is actually higher than that of the CDS market: 0.64 (0.62) on average according to the HM (GG) measure. According to this measure, a firm-specific stock market leadership is supported for as much as 68% (62%) of the companies in that specific year.
Hence, our results are fully consistent with those provided by Norden and Weber (2009) and Forte and Peña (2009) when the analysis is confined to a comparable sample period. Table 7 , where we define crisis and non-crisis GG and HM measures according to the last observation included in the estimation sample.
9 <Table 7 about here> during times of financial crisis, whereas the CDS market contribution to price discovery increases during quite times. Such a conclusion is supported in a number of ways. First, the mean HM m (GG m ) amounts to 0.59 (0.71) during crisis periods, and to 0.47 (0.45) during non-crisis periods. Second, HM m (GG m ) supports the stock market leadership in 89% (98%) of the time frames during crisis periods, but only in 40% (38%) of the time frames during non-crisis periods. Third, the stock market leadership is detected for 62% (72%) of the companies during crisis periods according to HM (GG), but only for 47% (41%) of the companies during non-crisis periods.
In order to make the aforementioned analysis and conclusions more formal, we test the equality of means for crisis vs. non-crisis sub-samples using the Welch t-test and the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test. Results, depicted in Table 8 , demonstrate that the null hypothesis of equality of means is strongly rejected at the 1% significance level in all of the cases. In particular, the GG m and HM m information shares, as well as the number of companies with GG and HM measures higher than 0.5, are all significantly higher in crisis vs.
non crisis periods. Further, we test whether HM m and GG m information shares are higher than 0.5 during crisis periods, and whether they are lower than 0.5 during non-crisis periods. It turns out that both measures are significantly higher than 0.5 during crisis periods, and significantly lower than 0.5 during non-crisis periods. Finally, we test whether the number of companies with GG and HM measures above 0.5 is higher than half of the sample (46 companies) during crisis periods, and whether it is lower than half of the sample during noncrisis periods. Once again, results support the conclusion that in times of financial crisis the stock market tends to lead the credit risk price discovery process, whereas in tranquil times the CDS market tends to lead this process.
<Table 8 about here> Factors underlying credit risk discovery
In this section, we extend the previous analysis by investigating additional factors that may influence the informational dominance of the stock and CDS markets. As we have shown, the relative contribution of these markets to credit risk discovery differs not only between companies, but also within the same company across different periods. Thus, our starting point are the firm-specific observations obtained in the analysis of yearly periods, and rolling GG and HM information shares. Regarding potential factors, and in light of the existing literature and our own findings, we consider the following: liquidity of the CDS and stock markets, credit quality of the reference entity, presence of significant credit shocks, and crisis vs. non-crisis time periods. A detailed description follows.
CDS percentage bid-ask spread (CRBA).
Liquidity is an obscure concept and there is no one, universally accepted liquidity measure. The literature has considered many different alternatives, with the percentage bid-ask spread being one of the most commonly used. We therefore use the average percentage bid-ask spread (calculated relative to the mid-quote) over the corresponding yearly period, or time frame. It appears natural to presume that the higher the CDS market liquidity, the higher its contribution to credit risk discovery. As a result, we expect a negative relationship between this illiquidity measure and the CDS market leadership.
Stock percentage bid-ask spread (SRBA). As a counterpart to the considered measure in the CDS market, in the case of the stock market we employ the same illiquidity measurethe relative quoted spread (calculated relative to the quote mid-point). As before, the stock percentage bid-ask spread is calculated over the corresponding yearly period, or time frame.
We expect that the higher the stock market liquidity, the more information revelation occurs in the stock market and, thus, the higher the stock market contribution to credit risk discovery. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between this illiquidity measure and the stock market leadership.
Credit condition (CCON).
Previous research (Norden and Weber, 2009; Forte and Lovreta, 2009) suggests not only that the CDS market is sensitive to the stock market, but also that the magnitude of the sensitivity increases with the decrease in the creditworthiness of the reference entity, i.e. the lower the credit quality of the underlying reference entity, the higher the strength of the relationship between the stock and CDS markets. Thus, it seems suitable to test whether the overall credit risk level also affects the relative informational dominance of considered markets. We proxy the credit condition with the mean CDS spread level over the corresponding yearly period, or time frame, as this measure seems to provide the best available indication of the underlying credit condition of the company.
Relative frequency of adverse shocks (ADS). CDS contracts, as a form of insurance,
are subject to moral hazard and asymmetric information risk, especially considering that major participants in the market are primarily insiders (banks, insurance companies, hedge funds). Acharya and Johnson (2007) have shown that information revelation in the CDS market is asymmetric, consisting exclusively of bad news. Accordingly, we expect that the information share of the CDS market will be positively related to the presence of negative and severe credit events. We approximate the severity of credit deterioration by the relative frequency of adverse shocks, defined as an increase in the CDS spread level of more than 3 standard deviations from the mean, relative to the total number of observations within the specific yearly period, or time frame. Such definition incorporates the idea that, when volatility is high, daily changes in the CDS level may also be high but not related to firmspecific credit deterioration shocks. Without imposing any probability distribution to deviations in the CDS level, in view of Chebyshev's inequality, no more than 11% of the distribution values could be more than 3 standard deviations from the mean. For the purpose of robustness we alternatively consider adverse shocks defined as a daily increase in the CDS spread level of more than 2 standard deviations from the mean. Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Forte and Lovreta (2009) define adverse shocks as a one-day increase in the CDS level of 50 bp or more. For the sample under consideration this doesn't seem to be a suitable measure.
Namely, it is important to control for the level of volatility as mean changes in the CDS level will be higher for companies with higher CDS levels, and lower for companies with lower CDS levels. Our sample actually covers the recent financial crisis in which daily jumps of 50 bp or more represent a frequently observed phenomenon.
Credit rating downgrades (CRDOWN).
Previous research provides evidence that both stock and CDS market anticipate credit rating downgrades but that CDS spreads respond earlier than stock prices to rating events (Norden and Weber, 2004; Di Cesare, 2006) . As well, several studies find evidence of an immediate CDS market reaction to negative credit rating events (these results do not seem to hold for positive rating events), meaning that credit rating announcements convey some new information to the market (Norden and Weber, 2004; Hull et al., 2004; Di Cesare, 2006) . If both markets do not react identically to credit rating downgrades it seems suitable to consider downward changes in credit rating as an explanatory variable of information shares. Thus, as an additional indicator of severe credit deterioration shocks, we introduce a credit rating downgrade dummy variable that takes value 1 if a credit rating downgrade occurred within the specific yearly period, or time frame, and 0 otherwise. In line with previous research, we expect that the information share of the CDS market will be positively related to the presence severe credit events -credit downgrades.
Financial crisis effect (CRISIS).
The overall period considered in this study (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) ) is characterized by a substantial time effect: it covers periods of financial distress and high credit risk level across reference entities (2002 and mid-2007 to 2008) , and quiet periods with low credit risk level (2003 to mid-2007) . We have already seen that the stock market tends to lead in times of financial crisis. In light of this finding we include a dummy variable that takes value 1 for crisis periods and value 0 for non-crisis periods. We reasonably expect the dummy variable to be positively related with the information share of the stock market.
Results from the analysis of yearly periods provide estimates of the GG and HM information shares for 643 firm-period observations. Results from the analysis of rolling information shares provide estimates of the GG and HM measures for 154,874 firm-period observations. The considered model, in which GG and HM information shares serve as the dependent variable, takes the following form: . (5) The model is estimated using panel data with random effects (preferred according to the Hausman test) for yearly firm-period observations. In the case of rolling firm-period information shares the model has to account for the autocorrelation in residuals. Accordingly, the GLS panel data random effects model with AR(1) structure in the residuals has been estimated. Summary results for conducted panel regressions are provided in Table 9 .
<Table 9 about here>
It seems that, despite its parsimony, the proposed econometric framework is capable of revealing significant determinants of information shares. The information share of the stock market proves to be significantly positively influenced by the credit condition of the underlying reference entity: the higher the CDS level, the higher the information share of the stock market. In addition, obtained panel regression results confirm the previous finding that the information share of the stock market tends to be higher in crisis periods. On the other hand, and consistent with the initial hypothesis, the presence of significant credit shocks positively influences the information share of the CDS market. This finding is equally supported by the relative frequency of adverse shocks variable and the credit downgrade dummy variable. The illiquidity regressors, and , point out in the expected direction: an increase in the stock market illiquidity implies a lower information share of the stock market (higher information share of the CDS market); an increase in the CDS market illiquidity implies a higher information share of the stock market (lower information share of the CDS market).
Taken as a whole, our results allow for several conclusions. First, the information share of the stock market tends to be higher during periods of financial distress. Second, the credit risk of a particular company has a positive effect on the information share of its stock beyond the effect of the overall state of the economy. Third, while we could think that these results contradict previous evidence of insider trading in the market for credit derivatives (Acharya and Johnson, 2007) , they actually don't. Quite the opposite, our results reinforce the view that the information share of the CDS market tends to be higher in the presence of severe credit downturns.
Robustness checks
Previous analysis has been conducted by imposing cointegration to all companies in the sample. As a first robustness check we repeat the analysis by considering only the 56 companies for which cointegration between CDS and ICS series has been distinctively suggested by the Johansen Cointegration Test. As reported in Table 10 , results from this subsample of 56 companies mirror the results from the full sample (Table 9 ). This confirms our initial conclusions. The stock (CDS) market is significantly more informative as regards credit risk during crisis (non-crisis) periods. The information share of the stock (CDS) market also increases (decreases) with the stock market liquidity and the credit risk level. Finally, the information share of the stock (CDS) market decreases (increases) with the CDS market liquidity and the presence of severe credit deterioration shocks.
<Table 10 about here>
The estimation of ICS time series rely on the structural model and calibration methodology described in Forte (2011) . One particular aspect of this methodology is that the default barrier parameter is calibrated from the time series of CDS spreads. While Forte and Peña (2009) have already shown that price discovery analysis on the basis of CDS and ICS time series is not materially affected by this way of determining the default barrier, it may be convenient to verify that our results are also robust to other default barrier specifications.
Hence, we repeat the analysis by defining the default barrier using the smooth-pasting condition value. In this way, all parameters of the model are estimated exclusively from the stock market (and a small subset of balance sheet items). As reported in Table 11 , results obtained with the new ICS estimates are virtually the same as those already reported in Table   9 . In conclusion, irrespective of the way the default barrier in the structural model is estimated, the pattern of the time development of the information share of the stock market (and consequently the CDS market) remains the same: higher in crisis periods and lower in non-crisis periods. 11 Results regarding other factors underlying credit risk discovery are also fully consistent with our previous findings.
<Table 11 about here>
Conclusions
The credit risk of any given company is implicitly or explicitly reflected through market prices of different credit sensitive claims, including stocks and credit default swaps. We provide empirical evidence that allows for several conclusions. First, credit risk discovery in the stock and CDS markets is a dynamic process. The stock market tends to lead in periods of financial crisis, whereas the CDS market gains on the importance during tranquil periods. Second, the credit condition of the reference entity has a positive effect on the information share of its stocks which goes above and beyond the effect of the overall state of the economy. These conclusions are not in contradiction with the argument of insider trading in credit derivatives, however. As the third main contribution of the paper we provide evidence that the information share of the CDS market is positively related to the presence of severe credit shocks. It is finally worth noting that all previous conclusions have been derived after controlling for liquidity effects. As expected, the illiquidity of the stock and CDS market is inversely related with the information share of the respective markets.
Appendix A The Model
The market value of total assets at any time , , is assumed to evolve according to the continuous diffusion process:
where is the expected rate of return on the asset value, is the fraction of the asset value paid out to investors, is the asset return volatility, and is a standard Brownian motion. Default occurs whenever reaches a specific critical point , defined as a fraction of the nominal value of total debt :
Following Leland and Toft (1996) and Leland (2004) , the value of an individual bond , with maturity , principal , and constant coupon flow , is given by: In order to resemble the true debt structure as much as possible, it is assumed that at each instant the company has ten bonds -one with a maturity of one year and principal equal to , and nine with maturity ranging from two to ten years, each with principal equal to 1/9 of . The coupon of each bond is determined as the fraction of average interest expenses proportional to the weight of the principal of each individual bond , over the total principal value of debt . The total principal is defined as the sum of the short-term liabilities and long-term liabilities .
Finally, the equity value is expressed as:
where | 0 is the market value of total debt when bankruptcy costs equal zero.
The theoretical credit spread at time is determined as the premium from issuing, at par value, a hypothetical bond with the same maturity as the corresponding CDS contract -in this case, 5
years. This bond should pay a coupon 5, , so that the following equation holds:
, 5| . (A.6.a) Accordingly, the bond yield is: .6.b) Consequently, the theoretical credit spread is determined as the difference between the yield of this hypothetical bond and the corresponding risk-free rate:
Estimation Procedure
For an assumed initial arbitrary value of , the constant volatility and the series of total firm's asset value are simultaneously estimated on the basis of the following algorithm:
1) Proposing an initial value for , ;
2) Estimating series using the information on the stock market capitalization , so that (A.5) holds for all ;
3) Estimating new volatility from the obtained series; 4) Ending the process if . Otherwise, is proposed at step 1.
The process is repeated until convergence is achieved.
As a result, different ICS series can be estimated on the basis of equation (A.5), depending on the value imposed for the default point indicator, . The default point is determined such that the divergence between credit spread series, measured by the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE), is minimized:
where
Note that, in this last step, we slightly depart from Forte (2011) , who define as:
, where ∑ .
Appendix B
In order to provide additional support for the argument that ICS outperform stock returns typically used in the literature, we estimate the following models for changes in CDS spreads.
Model A: 
In Model A, changes in CDS spreads are regressed on contemporaneous and past changes in ICS and on past changes in CDS spreads. As a counterpart, Model B takes contemporaneous and past stock returns into account rather than changes in ICS. Following Acharya and Johnson (2007), we impose the lag length of up to five days, which seems reasonable for capturing the overall information processing and transmission. Time-series regressions are estimated separately for each company in the sample. 12 Average adj. R 2 statistics undoubtedly shows that Model A has higher explanatory power than does Model B: 30% for Model A against 26% for Model B. On a firm specific basis, adjusted R 2 for model A is higher than adjusted R 2 for model B for 66 companies (72% of the sample). These results suggest that ICS contain certain incremental information as opposed to stock returns.
As a complementary analysis, Model C extends Model B by including contemporaneous and past changes in ICS, along with contemporaneous and past stock returns.
Model C:
3)
The following alternative hypotheses are tested:
Results indicate that in 30 out of 92 possible cases the null hypothesis that changes in CDS are independent of contemporaneous and past stock returns, is rejected. In contrast, the null hypothesis that changes in CDS are independent of contemporaneous and past changes in ICS is rejected in 52
cases.
Footnotes
1 It may not be the case in practice if non-default components affect CDS premia (e.g. taxes, liquidity). 2 Such an approach has been regularly applied for investigating the informational content of CDS and bonds (Blanco et al., 2005; Zhu, 2006; Norden and Weber, 2009) . 3 The analysis could also benefit from considering the bond market in addition to the stock and CDS markets.
This extension, however, would probably be achieved at the cost of a substantial reduction in the number of companies in the final sample (see Blanco et. al. 2005; Zhu, 2006; Norden and Weber, 2009; and Forte and Peña, 2009) . 4 The GFI CDS database has been previously used by Hull et al. (2004) (-1.12 ) (-9.48 ) (-7.38) Credit downgrade dummy CRDOWN -0.12 *** -0.12 *** -0.12 *** -0.12 *** -0.02 *** -0.02 *** -0.02 *** -0.02 *** (-3.41) (-3.42 ) (-3.34 ) (-3.37 
